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I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2014, Judge Lewis Kaplan issued an injunction forbidding 
U.S. enforcement of a nearly $9 billion Ecuadoran judgment against 
Chevron that was procured by the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fraud.1  The 
injunction is the latest in a legal saga related to alleged environmental 
torts arising from petroleum production in the Lago Agrio region of 
Ecuador; the litigation has spanned three decades and numerous 
countries and thus has attracted considerable scholarly attention.  
Commentators have addressed the initial lawsuit that was filed in the 
United States under the Alien Tort Statute but dismissed on forum non 
conveniens (FNC) grounds, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., and cases 
consolidated with it;2 the subsequent proceedings in Ecuador pursuant to 
legislation secured by the plaintiffs’ attorneys and the potential obstacles 
for having that judgment recognized and enforced;3 the actual preemptive 
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 1.  Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Judge Lewis Kaplan 
issued an extensive 500 page opinion). 
 2.  E.g., Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of 
Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 413 (2006); 
Malcolm J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy: 
Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In re: Union Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua, and 
Aguinda, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 299 (2001); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Justice Restored: Using a 
Preservation-of-Court-Access Approach to Replace Forum Non Conveniens in Five International 
Product-Injury Case Studies, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 53 (2003); see also Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 
142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 
F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 3.  E.g., John S. Baker, Jr. & Agustin Parise, Conflicts in International Tort Litigation 
Between U.S. and Latin American Courts, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (2010); M. Ryan 
Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient is Forum Non Conveniens in 
Transnational Litigation?, 4 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 21 (2007); Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. 
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action brought by Chevron in the United States to enjoin enforcement;4 
and the parallel arbitration between Chevron and the Republic of 
Ecuador pursuant to a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).5 
Although the duration and number of proceedings, the sums 
involved, and the massive fraud are extraordinary, the Lago Agrio 
proceedings provide a vehicle to understand an issue that arises in less 
spectacular cases (like a Colombian widow’s wrongful death action for 
her husband’s fall in an elevator, or the claims of Costa Rican 
commercial farmers for property damage related to the fungicide 
Benlate)6: the lack of access by plaintiffs from developing countries to an 
adequate forum for their tort claims against U.S. multinational 
                                                          
 
ChevronTexaco: Discretionary Grounds for the Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments for 
Environmental Injury in the United States, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241 (2010) [hereinafter 
Discretionary]; Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Mandatory Grounds for the Non-
Recognition of Foreign judgments for Environmental Injury in the United States, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. & POL’Y 1 (2009) [hereinafter Mandatory]; Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think 
Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456 (2011); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and 
Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081 (2010); Cortelyou Kenney, Comment, Disaster in the 
Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational Human Rights Litigation, 97 CAL. L. REV. 
857 (2009); Christina Weston, Comment, The Enforcement Loophole: Judgment-Recognition 
Defenses as a Loophole to Corporate Accountability for Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
731 (2011). 
 4.  E.g., Suraj Patel, Delayed Justice: A Case Study of Texaco and the Republic of Ecuador’s 
Operations, Harms, and Possible Redress in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 71 
(2012); Catherine A. Rogers, When Bad Guys Are Wearing White Hats, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 
487 (2013); Jeff Todd, The Rhetoric of Recognition, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 209 (2013) [hereinafter 
Rhetoric of Recognition]; Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non 
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444 (2011). 
 5.  E.g., Charles N. Brower & Diane Brown, From Pinochet in the House of Lords to the 
Chevron/Ecuador Lago Agrio Dispute: The Hottest Topics in International Dispute Resolution, 26 
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2013); George K. Foster, Investors, States, and 
Stakeholders: Power Asymmetries in International Investment and the Stabilizing Potential of 
Investment Treaties, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 361 (2013); Chiara Giorgetti, Mass Tort Claims in 
International Investment Proceedings: What Are the Lessons from the Ecuador-Chevron Dispute?, 
34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 787 (2013); Robert V. Percival, Global Law and the Environment, 86 WASH. L. 
REV. 579 (2011); see also Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Ecuador, Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 103-15 (1997) [hereinafter U.S.-Ecuador BIT]; Claimants’ Notice of Arbitration, Chevron 
Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.chevron. 
com/Documents/Pdf/Ecuadorbiten.pdf. 
 6.  Van Detta, supra note 2, at 72–86 (citing Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (en banc); Proyectos Orchimex de Costa Rica, S.A. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 896 
F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1995)).  Several scholars have also compared the Lago Agrio litigation to 
the cases involving agricultural workers from Latin American countries who allege exposure to the 
pesticide DBCP, which were dismissed from the U.S. on FNC grounds in the 1980s and 1990s; 
subsequent cases by Nicaraguan plaintiffs have either been dismissed with prejudice from the U.S. 
or, if they have foreign money judgments, denied recognition and enforcement.  E.g., Rhetoric of 
Recognition, supra note 4, passim; Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 3, passim. 
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corporations.  The judicial systems of plaintiffs’ home countries are often 
inadequate to handle mass tort claims7—and sometimes are even hostile 
to certain types of plaintiffs like indigenous peoples.8  Many 
commentators therefore advocate a change to FNC or to the hodge-podge 
of state laws about recognition and enforcement of foreign money 
judgments.9  Another potential solution would blur the lines between 
private and public international law.  While current international 
tribunals allow for claims only between States, or by citizens against a 
State but not a corporation,10 BITs between the United States and 
developing countries might be drafted to allow for affected citizens of 
the host country to have access to U.S. courts—or even to arbitration 
tribunals that until now have been available only for the Host State and 
the corporation.11 
The ultimate goal is a forum that accommodates the needs of all 
stakeholders, but a closer analysis reveals that none of these solutions 
can quite do that.  For example, changing or eliminating FNC to force a 
U.S. trial may help plaintiffs, but it does not necessarily force all 
stakeholders to participate—one noteworthy fact in granting the Aguinda 
dismissal was the lack of full participation by Ecuador and PetroEcuador, 
which had sovereign immunity.12  And the procedures enacted in 
plaintiffs’ home countries upon which the judgments are based invite 
                                                          
 7.  E.g., Rhetoric of Recognition, supra note 4, at 236. 
 8.  E.g., Kimerling, supra note 2, at 426–27 (describing how Ecuador sought to assimilate the 
native inhabitants of the Amazon region into the dominant national culture through tactics that 
threatened the survival of the people); Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and Global Climate 
Change: Intercultural Models of Climate Equity, 25 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 7, 9–10 (2010) (noting 
that Latin American nations often give timber and mineral rights that result in the destruction of the 
native lands of indigenous peoples). 
 9.  E.g., Baker & Parise, supra note 3, at 30–31 (urging a return to territoriality-based 
principles of conflicts of laws that would have the United States apply the law of the foreign forum 
in judicial proceedings); Montre D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes 
International, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1165 (2007) (proposing that the systemic inadequacy 
ground be eliminated as unconstitutional); Kenney, supra note 3, at 865 (advocating for more 
aggressive dismissal conditions on defendants at FNC stage); Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, 
at 1500–01 (recommending that judgment debtors be judicially estopped from arguing the systemic 
inadequacy ground of non-recognition during enforcement actions for cases previously dismissed for 
FNC). 
 10.  Foster, supra note 5, at 390; Giorgetti, supra note 5, at 794; see Maura Mullen de Bolívar, 
Note, A Comparison of Protecting the Environmental Interests of Latin-American Indigenous 
Communities from Transnational Corporations under International Human Rights and 
Environmental Law, 8 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 105, 138–42, 147 (1998) (detailing petition 
brought by indigenous peoples against Ecuador in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and how it “will not solve their immediate problems”). 
 11.  Foster, supra note 5, at 393, 398; Megan Wells Sheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A 
Friend or Foe to Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 493–94, 506 (2011). 
 12.  Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 474 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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manipulation and fraud,13 so a streamlined recognition and enforcement 
process may not be viable.  While turning to public law solutions like 
treaties offers interesting possibilities, these require the consent of the 
States involved—and to an extent the acquiescence of the multinational 
corporations.14  An examination of the actions and arguments of the 
stakeholders during the Lago Agrio proceedings reveals an unwillingness 
to open more access.  Indeed, the parties have framed their interests in 
narrow ways, continually reducing their complex relationships to “us-
versus-them” oppositions, with the “us” and the “them” changing to take 
advantage of the limitations of the particular forum. 
Scholars need to understand these oppositional constructs if they are 
to find solutions to the problem of forums that do not allow for 
participation by all stakeholders.  Audience identity, framing strategies, 
and explication of texts are rhetorical concerns, so rhetorical theory can 
provide the avenue for this understanding.15  Because the Lago Agrio 
proceedings deal with environmental torts, environmental rhetoric is 
particularly apt for this analysis.  Though rarely applied in legal 
scholarship,16 environmental rhetoric offers insights about the ways in 
which language about environmental issues—in particular the ways in 
which stakeholders define themselves and each other—reinforces 
entrenched positions and limits the ability of stakeholders to understand 
each other.17  By explicating and understanding these limits, we can look 
                                                          
 13.  Rogers, supra note 4, at 505; see Jeff Todd, Phantom Torts and Forum Non Conveniens 
Blocking Statutes: Irony and Metonym in Nicaraguan Special Law 364, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. 
REV. 291, 314–16 (2012) [hereinafter Phantom Torts] (detailing a California court’s findings about 
how a Nicaraguan blocking statute contributed to a fraudulent scheme that tainted pesticide exposure 
claims). 
 14.  Foster, supra note 5, at 399, 404. 
 15.  Kirsten K. Davis, Legal Forms as Rhetorical Transaction: Competency in the Context of 
Information and Efficiency, 79 UMKC L. REV. 667, 677 (2011); Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing 
Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (2006); Rhetoric of Recognition, supra 
note 4, at 212, 220–21; Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 1545, 1546–48 (1990); see Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: 
Toward a New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 12 (2000) (writing that “rhetoric has the 
very real effect of severely constraining our perception of a problem and its potential solutions”). 
 16.  Michael Burger, Environmental Law / Environmental Literature, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 3 
(2013) (claiming that his article is the first to integrate Law and Literature scholarship with the study 
of environmental law). 
 17.  E.g., Rick Carpenter, Place Identity and the Socio-Spatial Environment, in ROUTLEDGE 
STUDIES IN RHETORIC AND COMMUNICATION: ENVIRONMENTAL RHETORIC AND ECOLOGIES OF 
PLACE 200 (2013) (Peter N. Goggin ed., 2013) (claiming that stakeholder in environmental debates 
often align “in terms of a supporter and opponent binary”); Peter N. Goggin, Introduction, in 
ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN RHETORIC AND COMMUNICATION: ENVIRONMENTAL RHETORIC AND 
ECOLOGIES OF PLACE, supra, at 1, 5 (“Environmental rhetorics . . . tend to contribute to polarizing 
public opinion on environmental concerns and engender divisive discourse that Killingsworth and 
Palmer term ‘ecospeak.’”) (citing M. JIMMIE KILLINGSWORTH & JACQUELINE S. PALMER, 
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for ways to achieve some level of common understanding, and from 
there potential solutions.18 
Section II explains environmental rhetoric, with a focus on the 
foundational work of Killingsworth and Palmer, Ecospeak, and its 
grounding in preeminent twentieth century rhetorician Kenneth Burke’s 
concept of identification.19  This Section also shows how scholars in both 
the humanities and law have applied environmental rhetoric.  Section III 
summarizes the facts and proceedings in the Lago Agrio litigation and 
arbitration.  Section IV addresses the legal scholarship about the lack of 
access by foreign plaintiffs to the courts of their own country or of the 
United States, potential solutions through revisions of U.S. court access 
doctrines, and the shortcomings of these proposals in light of the results 
of the Lago Agrio proceedings.  Section V then turns to another solution 
proffered in several recent articles, the potential for BITs to provide 
foreign individuals with access to U.S. courts or to international 
arbitration tribunals.  From this background the article in Section VI 
explicates texts from the Lago Agrio proceedings to demonstrate how 
stakeholders employ the tactics of ecospeak to reinforce their entrenched 
positions, thus demonstrating that not only private but also public law 
solutions may be more elusive than what scholars hope.  In Section VI, 
the Article concludes that a better understanding of the points of shared 
interests among the stakeholders may nonetheless allow for redress for 
environmental harms by States and, at least to an extent, for foreign 
individuals. 
                                                          
 
ECOSPEAK: RHETORIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN AMERICA (1992)). 
 18.  E.g., Burger, supra note 16, at 5 (writing that ecocritical techniques like environmental 
rhetoric “offer[] a way to uncover how we identify and define problems (and problem-makers), how 
we conceive desirable goals (and goal-achievers) and how we craft solutions”); Carl G. Herndl & 
Stuart C. Brown, Introduction, in GREEN CULTURE: ENVIRONMENTAL RHETORIC IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 3, 3–5 (Carl G. Herndl & Stuart C. Brown eds., 1996) (“rhetoric and its 
analytic methods can help us understand the nature of our environmental debates and their 
outcomes.”). 
 19.  Burke developed his theory of dramatism over eight books and numerous articles.  See 
WILLIAM H. RUECKERT, KENNETH BURKE AND THE DRAMA OF HUMAN RELATIONS xiii (2d ed. 
1982).  Although none of his individual works captures this technique, several scholars have 
attempted to synthesize Burke’s corpus.  See id.; ROBERT L. HEATH, REALISM AND RELATIVISM: A 
PERSPECTIVE ON KENNETH BURKE (1986); GREIG E. HENDERSON, KENNETH BURKE: LITERATURE 
AND LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION (1988).  More modest treatments can also be found in legal 
literature.  E.g., Delia B. Conti, Narrative Theory and the Law: A Rhetorician’s Invitation to the 
Legal Academy, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 457 (2001); Jeff Todd, The Poetics and Ethics of Negligence, 50 
CAL. W. L. REV. 75 (2013). 
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II. ENVIRONMENTAL RHETORIC AND ECOSPEAK 
A central tenet of law and rhetoric is that the law is created through 
its practice, through the discursive acts of the persons involved in the 
litigation of disputes.20  Accordingly, to understand legal issues, critics 
must examine both the practice of law and its practitioners—broadly 
defined to include parties, courts, juries, deliberative bodies, and even 
persons who are not part of legal proceedings.21  While the interplay of 
litigants in an adversarial system is the paradigm for rhetoric as 
argument, even seemingly neutral tribunals employ rhetorical strategies 
when they adopt the position of the prevailing party to justify their 
choice of finding that that litigant is right while the other is wrong.22  
Davis thus calls rhetorical analysis “an exploration of the meaning-
making process, one in which the law is constituted, as human beings 
located within particular historical and cultural communities write, read, 
argue about, and decide legal issues.”23  Rhetorical critics therefore take 
texts that embody discursive practices and arguments, such as judicial 
opinions, as the object of study.24 
In analyzing judicial opinions, the critic must consider not only the 
discursive moves made by participants, but also how non-participants are 
obfuscated or avoided.  After all, tribunals minimize or even exclude 
some voices from being heard even though those persons have a stake in 
                                                          
 20.  NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING 
6–7 (2005) (writing that the law arises in the context of adjudication and the practice of 
decisionmaking among rival arguments); Francis J. Mootz, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice 
and Theory, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 491, 584 (1998) (calling “[Justice] the condition which 
permits the legal actors and authorities to come to know what justice demands in the situation 
through a process of argumentation. This rhetorical knowledge is made possible by the critical 
dimensions of legal practice.”); Rhetoric of Recognition, supra note 4, at 212 (“Rhetorical theory 
requires that we approach the law not in the abstract but in the context of practice, as the interplay 
between litigants and courts and even extending to the social and political context”); James Boyd 
White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 684, 684 (1985) (Rhetoric is “the central art by which community and culture are established, 
maintained, and transformed.”). 
 21.  Mootz, supra note 20, at 575–76; Rhetoric of Recognition, supra note 4, at 216–21; White, 
supra note 20, at 692. 
 22.  MACCORMICK, supra note 20, at 123; see Mootz, supra note 20, at 571 (“Ultimately, 
judicial consideration of the case and issuance of a written opinion mark a distinct rhetorical practice 
shaped by the judge’s effort first to persuade herself and then to persuade the parties in the litigation 
and the hypothetical collection of all reasonable lawyers.”). 
 23.  Davis, supra note 15, at 677 (citation omitted). 
 24.  Rhetoric of Recognition, supra note 4, at 212; Wetlaufer, supra note 15, at 1546, 1548; 
White, supra note 20, at 697; see Jeff Todd, A Rhetoric of Warning Defects, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 343, 
347 (2012) (“Rhetoric posits that meaning and power reside in the textual relationship.”). 
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the outcome of the proceedings.25  Rhetorical criticism therefore begins 
with the questions: “[W]hat voices does the law allow to be heard, what 
relations does it establish among them?  With what voice, or voices, does 
the law itself speak?”26  Mootz writes that the law is just when the 
argumentative positions of all stakeholders “are taken up freely in an 
arena that grants them a fair hearing.”27  Davis urges legal scholars to 
“do more than trace the precedents that have been left to us by privileged 
social actors.”28  Rather than certainty and closure, a rhetorical view of 
law pulls us in the direction of complexity, contingency, and 
uncertainty.29 
A number of legal scholars have applied rhetoric to explore the 
complexities of environmental issues ranging from arguments for or 
against the passage of environmental protection laws, to the framing 
strategies used to portray the different regulatory options for combatting 
greenhouse gas emissions, to a tropological analysis of the scholarship 
and proceedings related to FNC blocking statutes.30  While applying 
general rhetorical theory provides a rationale for the practice of law,31 
environmental rhetoric is particularly apt for critiquing, understanding, 
and potentially resolving the complex interrelationships of stakeholders 
in international environmental tort disputes.  Killingsworth and Palmer in 
their foundational book on environmental rhetoric, Ecospeak, write: 
Classically defined as the production and interpretation of signs and the 
use of logical, ethical, and emotional appeals in deliberations about 
public action, rhetoric is both a theory and a practical art.  On the one 
hand, it analyzes and models discourse practices; on the other hand, it 
seeks to improve these practices.32 
                                                          
 25.  Rhetoric of Recognition, supra note 4, at 220. 
 26.  White, supra note 20, at 697. 
 27.  Mootz, supra note 20, at 582–83. 
 28.  Davis, supra note 15, at 677 (citation omitted). 
 29.  Wetlaufer, supra note 15, at 1595. 
 30.  Doremus, supra note 15, at 12 (writing that “rhetoric has the very real effect of severely 
constraining our perception of a problem and its potential solutions”); Nash, supra note 15, at 316 
(concluding that “the precise way in which a problem or choice is presented—i.e., its frame—may 
affect the decisionmaker’s perception of the problem or choice, and ultimately the decisionmaker’s 
preference”); Phantom Torts, supra note 13, at 292–94 (applying metonymy to show how reducing 
the concept of “justice” to mean a U.S. trial secured via a blocking statute led to the ironic result of 
no meaningful trial in a U.S. court). 
 31.  E.g., MACCORMICK, supra note 20, at 6–7; FRANCIS J. MOOTZ III, LAW, HERMENEUTICS 
AND RHETORIC x (2010). 
 32.  KILLINGSWORTH & PALMER, supra note 17, at 1. 
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While many rhetorical works focus on rhetorica docens, the theory and 
pedagogy of rhetoric, Killingsworth and Palmer offer Ecospeak as a 
work of rhetorica utens, the study of rhetoric in use with the purpose of 
making a practical contribution that can have consequences for public 
discourse.33  The environmental rhetoric first articulated by 
Killingsworth and Palmer, and applied by numerous scholars over the 
last twenty years, can therefore provide the theoretical basis to offer 
practical insight for the resolution of the issues with international 
environmental tort disputes.  We turn first to a summary of concepts 
from preeminent twentieth century rhetorician Kenneth Burke that forms 
the core of ecospeak. 
A. Kenneth Burke and Dramatism: Terministic Screens, Substance, and 
Identification 
Burke defines man as the symbol-using animal.34  We use a system 
of symbols and language, not just to name objects or describe concepts, 
but also to induce action and to get others to identify with a point of view 
and respond accordingly.35  Language is therefore best conceived as 
symbolic action, with every word imbued with the quality of action—in 
brief, words have substance, or as Burke parses it, “sub-stance.”36  
Speakers take one stance over others through their very choice of words 
because words are symbols of reality, with each term offering a unique 
perception of our reality.  “Even if any given terminology is a reflection 
of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of 
reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of 
reality.”37  All utterances are therefore “terministic screens” that direct 
the attention toward one perspective—and away from the potential 
perspectives created by other terms.38  Burke offers the example of a 
series of photographs taken of the same object, except that the 
                                                          
 33.  Id. at 1–2. 
 34.  KENNETH BURKE, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION: ESSAYS ON LIFE, LITERATURE, AND 
METHOD 55 (1966) [hereinafter LASA]. 
 35.  HENDERSON, supra note 19, at 113–14 (“Value-ridden from the outset, language, for 
Burke, is intrinsically rhetorical . . . .”); see KENNETH BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES 38–39, 57–
58 (1950) [hereinafter MOTIVES]; KENNETH BURKE, ATTITUDES TOWARD HISTORY 266–67 (1937) 
[hereinafter ATH]. 
 36.  KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 22 (1945) [hereinafter GRAMMAR] 
(“Literally, a person’s or a thing’s sub-stance would be something that stands beneath or supports the 
person or thing.”). 
 37.  LASA, supra note 34, at 45. 
 38.  Id. 
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photographer used a different colored filter for each photo.39  Although 
each photo represented the same fact, the different filters revealed 
notable distinctions.40  Language likewise filters the presentation of 
reality so that “‘observations’ are but implications of the particular 
terminology . . . the spinning out of possibilities.”41  Because we must 
use language, we cannot avoid forming terministic screens between 
ourselves and reality, with each perspective “colored by competing 
cultural, philosophical, or motivational orientations.”42 
The key to Burke’s rhetoric is the concept of identification: through 
the use of symbols, actors identify terms with each other, so that one is 
substantially the same as the other.  This sharing of substance makes the 
terms consubstantial: “For substance, in the old philosophies, was an act; 
and a way of life is an acting-together; and in acting-together, men have 
common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them 
consubstantial.”43  Implied in identification is its ironic counterpart, 
division, for in understanding the shared substance of two things, we also 
realize that those two things are indeed separate.44  The choice of the 
essential term is a rhetorical move: “one may deflect attention from 
scenic matters by situating the motives of an act in the agent . . . or 
conversely, one may deflect attention from the criticism of personal 
motives by deriving an act or attitude not from traits of the agent [but] 
from the nature of the situation.”45 
B. Ecospeak 
The positions taken by stakeholders in environmental issues are due 
partially to different ethics and epistemologies, with groups holding 
separate and conflicting interests based on each group’s unique set of 
values.46  Rhetoricians like Killingsworth and Palmer recognize that 
these differences—and the difficulties in overcoming them—are also a 
problem of discourse.47  “All groups have a particular perspective and 
use a specialized language developed specifically to describe and 
stimulate the practices characteristic of their particular outlook on the 
                                                          
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 46. 
 42.  HEATH, supra note 19, at 90; see LASA, supra note 34, at 50. 
 43.  MOTIVES, supra note 35, at 21. 
 44.  Id. at 22–23. 
 45.  GRAMMAR, supra note 36, at 17. 
 46.  KILLINGSWORTH & PALMER, supra note 17, at 4. 
 47.  Id. at 6. 
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world.”48  Drawing upon Kenneth Burke’s concept of identification, the 
authors posit that each group has an “identifying story: I (or we) do 
this.”49  Those outside of the subject position (we) are not part of the 
narrative because they belong to other groups (you or they).50  To tell 
their story and thereby construct relationships with different groups for 
cooperative social action, members of the group must employ rhetorical 
appeals, “enlargements of the we category or mergers of two or more 
categories, with the ultimate goal being the identification of the ‘global’ 
public with the ‘local’ discourse community.”51  When these rhetorical 
appeals succeed, the group achieves an identity of interests by sharing its 
terms—its substance—with others, who act by accepting the group’s 
perspective.52  With many environmental issues, however, these appeals 
often fail, leading to “divisions that harden with time and with the 
repetition of rhetorical situations whose narrative outlines contain similar 
plots and characters.”53  The intractability of the environmental dilemma 
therefore results from the inability of the discourse communities to 
identify adequately with each other.54 
Such failed appeals are “the region of ecospeak, where public 
divisions are petrified, conflicts are prolonged, and solutions are deferred 
by a failure to criticize deeply the terms and conditions of the 
environmental dilemma.”55  Ecospeak is a type of shorthand, “a 
makeshift discourse for defining novel positions in public debate.”56  The 
rhetoric of ecospeak reveals that many environmental debates degrade to 
“oversimplified dichotom[ies],” such as between environmentalists on 
one side and developmentalists on the other.57  The former “seek long-
term protection of endangered environments regardless of short-term 
economic costs,” while the latter “seek short-term economic gain 
regardless of the long-term environmental costs.”58 
This dichotomy between white hats and black hats is not a matter of 
historical necessity so much as “a device of discourse used by one side or 
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the other (often both) to mobilize forces against a palpable villain.”59  
Therein lies the problem with using the shorthand of ecospeak to explore 
complex environmental issues: “its characteristic terminology and 
working rhetoric will cause oppositions to close into an irresolvable set 
of conflicts.”60  Like Newspeak from George Orwell’s 1984, “ecospeak 
becomes a form of language and a way of framing arguments that stops 
thinking and inhibits social cooperation rather than extending thinking 
and promoting cooperation through communication.”61  Ultimately, 
ecospeak conceals other sources of solidarity and of conflict that, if more 
closely examined, could reveal what is needed to cut through 
environmental dilemmas: 
Further rhetorical analysis breaks the hold of ecospeak by identifying 
various discourses on the environment before they are galvanized by 
dichotomous political rhetoric.  It does so too by studying the 
transformations of these discourses as they enter the public realm by 
way of a local discourse community . . . . At the very least, such 
analysis can reveal possible identifications and real conflicts passed 
over by an ever-too-glib retreat into ecospeak.62 
“As a first step beyond the simple dichotomy of environmentalist 
versus developmentalist,” Killingsworth and Palmer describe a 
framework of six different stakeholders in public environmental issues: 
traditional or mainstream science, government, business and industry, 
agriculture, social ecology (humanistic environmentalism), and deep 
ecology (wilderness ethic, nature mysticism).63  Rather than “absolute 
opposites,” these six occupy a continuum of environmental interests, 
with science at one extreme viewing nature as object and deep ecologists 
on the other viewing nature as spirit; in the middle, business and industry 
and agriculture view nature as a resource.64  Where those employing 
ecospeak “seek to achieve a measure of control over an audience . . . by 
categorizing an opponent into a single role,” the continuum of multiple 
shareholders suggests far more complexity—and therefore the 
possibilities that one stakeholder might hold both different and shared 
perspectives with another stakeholder.65  For example, the methods of 
science, the sovereignty of government, and the resources of business 
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and industry tend to put them in a more dominant position than the other 
three and suggest sources of opposition, as when agricultural interests 
oppose industrial development.66  But agriculture also depends upon 
industrial hardware and pesticides, and of course some agricultural 
enterprises are themselves big business.67  Sources of tension abound; for 
example, while business sometimes opposes governmental regulation, it 
also sometimes works with government to develop natural resources.68  
Rhetorical appeals can therefore flow in numerous directions “to 
overcome oppositions and divisions either by forming new solidarities, 
by reinforcing old ones, or by revealing distances or likenesses in order 
to transform attitudinal conflicts into political action.”69 
C. Environmental Rhetoric Applied in the Humanities and Law 
Rhetoricians over the last twenty years have continued to draw upon 
and expand Ecospeak and its Burkean foundation to critique public 
environmental issues.70  Herndl and Brown write that we cannot even 
approach the environment apart from the language that we use to 
represent it.71  Accordingly, “rhetoric and its analytic methods can help 
us understand the nature of our environmental debates and their 
outcomes.”72  Of particular interest is how issues are framed: the simple 
dichotomies of “environmental discourse [are] not as straightforward as” 
presented by stakeholders, so analyses of environmental rhetoric can 
penetrate the “details of a text and consider[] its relation to the context in 
which it circulates.”73  From this understanding a guide for rhetorical 
practice in the future can arise, with that rhetorical practice including 
law.74 
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A recent essay by Rick Carpenter is typical of the approach to 
environmental rhetorical analysis.  In the public debate about a proposed 
biomass electric generating plant in Valdosta, Georgia, stakeholders 
“aligned in terms of a supporter and opponent binary,” with their 
discourse often taking the form of ecospeak.75  Such discourse was too 
simplistic, however, because the conflict actually involved a range of 
interests in the plant.76  Through an explication of the arguments made by 
competing sides, Carpenter concludes that opponents of the plant 
prevailed because they understood the multiple and competing ways in 
which the conflict was situated.77  Rather than be divided over a 
fragmentation of interests, the opponents took advantage of that 
ambiguity to unite for “broad-based collective action.”78  They fought to 
establish their credibility and right to be heard in the face of decision-
makers labeling them a “fringe group.”79  In relying on such labels, the 
\proponents “construed the[] audience in narrow, exclusionary ways.”80  
“In assuming an unproblematic, uncomplicated common identity for 
their audience, rhetors can neglect to foster identification, which, as 
Kenneth Burke asserts, is always a rhetorical activity.”81  Though 
Carpenter analyzed a community debate to show how identities are 
located and socially produced, he asserts that national identity is likewise 
a rhetorical construct.82  The concept of the nation-state is a rigid 
conception that creates “a monolithic social space, a common sense of 
place and thus of self.”83 
In another recent work, Michael Burger applied ecospeak, 
environmental rhetoric and other forms of ecocriticism to examine U.S. 
environmental litigation.  Although he draws primarily from literature, 
including narrative and allegory, Burger also cites to rhetoric and to 
Ecospeak in claiming that “story, narrative and rhetoric are essential not 
only to environmental discourse in general, but also to environmental 
legal discourse in particular.”84  He explicates the ways that attorneys 
and judges establish, frame, narrate and argue their cases at various 
stages in actual litigation “to uncover how we identify and define 
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problems (and problem-makers), how we conceive desirable goals (and 
goal-achievers) and how we craft solutions.”85  As with scholars in the 
humanities, he writes that environmental debate is a “process of 
community- and identity-formation.”86  Ecocritical techniques therefore 
help to expose marginalized meanings and the multiplicity of actors 
involved in those debates.87  Burger describes the allegories employed in 
environmental debates, the recurring stories and tropes like the pastoral, 
wilderness and wildness, the environmental apocalyptic, and toxic tales 
that participants use to frame their arguments.88  He then applies these 
allegories to two different sets of environmental litigation, one dealing 
with the reintroduction of gray wolves in the Northern Rocky Mountains 
and the other a public nuisance lawsuit brought by two well-coordinated 
groups against power companies for carbon dioxide emissions.89  Burger 
uses a close reading of the pleadings, motions, and judicial opinions to 
demonstrate how the various stakeholders employed the allegories and 
why those strategies were, or were not, successful.90 
For example, the nuisance lawsuit was brought by several states and 
the City of New York against five power companies.91  The complaint 
contains a number of allegories, primarily the environmental apocalyptic, 
but also framing strategies in which the consortium of states modify the 
usual binary of environmentalist versus developmentalist by portraying 
themselves—and therefore the people they represent—as victims of 
environmental pollution.92  Rather than answer the complaint, and thus 
respond to the substantive climate change argument, the power 
companies filed a motion to dismiss based upon standing and separation 
of powers.93  By recasting the argument—including that multiple 
political actors are involved in pursuing their approach to this complex 
issue—the power companies created a more mundane issue that the 
district court adopted in a straightforward political question doctrine 
analysis.94  The language of the district court is strongest in discussing 
standing and policy but shifts to distancing strategies when alluding to 
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the facts in the complaint.95  The Second Circuit reversed in a 140-page 
opinion that in many places adopted the language of the states’ 
allegory.96  Burger concludes “that courts can and do respond to” 
environmental tropes employed by parties, so ecocriticism can inform the 
scholarly understanding of environmental law.97 
Before turning to rhetorical criticism of key texts, this Article first 
summarizes the complex Lago Agrio proceedings and then analyzes the 
scholarly criticism against doctrines that limited individual access to 
courts and other forums in those proceedings. 
III. THE LAGO AGRIO PROCEEDINGS: A BRIEF HISTORY 
A. Oil Operations in Ecuador and the Aguinda Lawsuit 
In 1964, the Republic of Ecuador allowed Texaco Petroleum 
Company (TexPet), a subsidiary of Texaco, to begin oil exploration in 
the Amazon basin.98  That part of Ecuador, the Orienté region, was 
remote from other parts of the country and was populated primarily by a 
number of indigenous peoples: the Kichwa, Huaorani, Cofan, Secoya, 
Siona, and Tetetes.99  The following year, Ecuador granted TexPet a 
petroleum concession for a consortium that it owned in equal shares with 
Gulf Oil Corporation.100  The consortium extracted, refined, and shipped 
crude oil from the Lago Agrio field in exchange for paying royalties to 
Ecuador.101  The Republic of Ecuador joined the consortium through its 
state-owned oil company PetroEcuador, which acquired Gulf’s interests 
in 1974.102  TexPet’s activities in the consortium declined, first in 1990 
when PetroEcuador assumed TexPet’s operation of a trans-Ecuadoran oil 
pipeline and drilling activities,103 then in 1992 when TexPet relinquished 
its interests in the consortium, thereby leaving PetroEcuador as the sole 
owner and operator in Lago Agrio since 1992.104 
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Shortly after TexPet ceased operations, a group of 46 named 
plaintiffs represented by U.S. attorneys Steven Donziger and Cristobal 
Bonifaz filed Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. in the Southern District of New 
York.105  This putative class action, on behalf of 30,000 indigenous 
people from Ecuador,106 alleged a number of tortious acts—leaking oil 
from the pipeline, deliberately spraying oil on the roads, and storing 
petroleum wastes in open pits.107  They claimed that these actions led to 
the pollution of “the rain forests and rivers” and to adverse health effects 
to residents.108  The plaintiffs sought money damages as well as equitable 
relief like funding for environmental remediation, renovating or closing 
the trans-Ecuador pipeline, establishing standards for future oil 
development, and medical monitoring.109  The court never addressed the 
merits of the complaint; instead, the next decade focused on two rounds 
of hearings over Texaco’s motion to dismiss for FNC. 
Plaintiffs sued only Texaco, not its TexPet subsidiary or 
PetroEcuador—the entities that actually operated the consortium.110  Nor 
was the Republic of Ecuador a party.111  Initially, Ecuador opposed the 
lawsuit as an affront to its sovereignty,112 but then various Ecuadoran 
officials showed their support for litigation in the United States as the 
“only” way to bring a solution to the plaintiffs’ situation.113  The district 
court nevertheless ordered dismissal on the grounds of comity and FNC, 
as well as on the independently sufficient ground of failure to join an 
indispensable party—PetroEcuador and the Republic of Ecuador.114  
Judge Jed S. Rakoff reasoned that without these parties, the equitable 
relief requested, “would be unenforceable on its face, prejudicial to both 
present and absent parties, and an open invitation to an international 
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political debacle.”115  After an election and change of administration in 
Ecuador, the Republic of Ecuador filed a motion to intervene, which was 
denied because Ecuador refused to waive sovereign immunity to 
potential crossclaims from the plaintiffs and counterclaims from 
Texaco.116 
Finding that pretrial discovery had produced no evidence that Texaco 
itself was involved in the operations in Ecuador, Judge Rakoff ordered 
dismissal.117  The Second Circuit vacated and remanded because the 
dismissal was not conditioned on Texaco consenting to jurisdiction in 
Ecuador, and because the trial court had relied too heavily on 
determinations of the Southern District of Texas in weighing the FNC 
factors.118  The Second Circuit also wrote that the court had to consider 
Ecuador’s changed position in re-evaluating comity and that the failure 
to join an indispensable party might not apply to all of the equitable 
relief requested.119  The court agreed that Ecuador must fully relinquish 
any claim to sovereign immunity to intervene, but nonetheless remanded 
this motion for reconsideration as well.120 
On remand, the Republic of Ecuador declined to participate in U.S. 
proceedings and refused to waive sovereign immunity.121  Texaco, on the 
other hand, stipulated to submit to the jurisdiction of Ecuadoran courts 
and then renewed its FNC motion.122  As a preliminary matter, Judge 
Rakoff considered the adequacy of the Ecuadoran courts, including 
further briefing on “whether the courts of Ecuador . . . are sufficiently 
independent and impartial to provide the requisite modicum of due 
process.”123  The parties, the U.S. State Department, and the Republic of 
Ecuador all submitted papers.124  Judge Rakoff found them “of little use” 
because they contained “broad, conclusory assertions as to the relative 
corruptibility or incorruptibility of the Ecuadorian courts, with scant 
reference to specifics, evidence, or application to the instant cases.”125  
He cited six particulars to support his conclusion that corruption and 
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politicization would not affect the instant proceedings, notably that there 
were no allegations of bias in favor of multinational defendants and none 
of the documentation of corruption related to civil proceedings.126 
Having determined the existence of an available and adequate forum, 
the trial court then turned to the private and public interest factors.127  
Under the private interest factors, Judge Rakoff cited the “glaring facts 
that neither the Government of Ecuador nor PetroEcuador . . . are parties 
to the instant suits, whereas they could be joined in any similar suit 
brought in Ecuador.”128  He again referred to the Ecuadoran government 
in considering the public interest factors, characterizing the dispute as 
Ecuadoran rather than American because the oil development activities 
at issue were based on “a conscious choice made by the Government of 
Ecuador in order to stimulate its economy.”129  Finding that on balance 
these factors favored litigating in Ecuador, Judge Rakoff ordered 
dismissal.130 
The Second Circuit affirmed.  As to the plaintiffs’ contention that 
Ecuadoran courts are subject to corruption and impartiality, the court 
listed each of the six “detailed findings” by Judge Rakoff and concluded, 
“We cannot say that these findings were an abuse of discretion.”131  As to 
the private interest factors, the court characterized as “significant” the 
fact that Ecuador and PetroEcuador could be joined in Ecuadoran but not 
U.S. courts, thus depriving a U.S. court of the ability to order several 
aspects of the equitable relief sought.132  The Second Circuit concluded 
that the district court was within its discretion in making these 
findings.133 
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B. Simultaneous Activities in Ecuador: Settlement Agreements between 
Ecuador and Texaco, and a New Ecuadoran Law to Benefit Plaintiffs 
While the dismissal of Aguinda was still being passed between the 
federal courts in New York, activities in Ecuador would affect these and 
later proceedings.  First, as part of relinquishing its stake in the 
consortium, TexPet entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with 
Ecuador that it would be released from any potential claims for 
environmental harms once it completed remediation of the operational 
sites.134  Ecuador and TexPet then signed a series of agreements in 1994 
and 1995 for the environmental remedial work.135  TexPet contracted 
with Woodward Clyde International and Smith Environmental 
Technologies to conduct its share of the $40 million remediation 
program (Ecuador had agreed that PetroEcuador would assume 
responsibility for part of the remediation).136  TexPet completed its 
remediation in 1998, for which the Ecuadoran government issued an acta 
that certified completion of remedial obligations under the 1995 
agreement.137  Ecuador and PetroEcuador on September 30, 1998, signed 
the final release of TexPet, Texaco, and their subsidiaries and successors 
from all present and future claims related to operations of the 
consortium.138 
Second, representatives of the Aguinda plaintiffs also negotiated with 
representatives of the Ecuadoran government.  For example, when Judge 
Rakoff first ordered dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party, 
plaintiffs approached the Ecuadoran government to encourage its motion 
to intervene.139  In exchange, plaintiffs gave Ecuador and PetroEcuador a 
judgment reduction agreement to protect them from Texaco’s potential 
claims for contribution.140  Then, with the possibility that the action 
would be dismissed from U.S. courts, plaintiffs’ representative Cristobal 
Bonifaz worked with Ecuador to secure passage of new legislation 
similar to the U.S. superfund law.141  The legislation was enacted in 
Ecuador’s Environmental Management Act of 1999 (the EMA), which 
“created a private right of action for damages for the cost of remediation 
                                                          
 134.  Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 386–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 135.  Kimerling, supra note 2, at 493. 
 136.  Id. at 493–98. 
 137.  Chevron, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 387. 
 138.  Id.  For a detailed account of these agreements and the type of remedial work that was 
actually undertaken, see Kimerling, supra note 2, at 493–514. 
 139.  Chevron, 974 F. Supp. 2d. at 389. 
 140.  Id. at 390. 
 141.  Id. at 391. 
354 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
of environmental harms generally, as distinct from personal injuries or 
property damages to specific plaintiffs.”142  Rather than a class action, 
the EMA provided plaintiffs something analogous to a citizens’ attorney 
general suit.  Baker and Parise characterize the EMA as an attempt by 
Ecuador “to circumvent the previous settlement with and release of 
Texaco.”143 
C. The Ecuadoran Judgment and Chevron’s Preemptive Suit for Non-
Recognition 
Because of the EMA, Aguinda did not die following dismissal but 
was refiled in Ecuador in 2003—with notable changes from the U.S. 
suit.144  The same named plaintiffs pursued some individual claims, such 
as compensation for medical treatment, but most of the damages were for 
environmental remediation on behalf of Ecuador.145  The defendant also 
changed: Chevron had acquired Texaco in 2001, and the latter remains a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Chevron.146  The court-appointed neutral 
expert opined that the court should award $27 billion in damages;147 the 
trial court instead entered judgment for approximately $8.6 billion, a 
figure that was doubled to $18 billion when Chevron declined to 
apologize within two weeks of the judgment, as well as costs to the 
Amazon Defense Front to administer the proceeds.148  Of note, the lion’s 
share of this judgment would go directly to the government of Ecuador 
for remediation of groundwater, drinking water, and soil, as well as 
damages to flora and fauna and delivery of health care.149 
Even before the judgment was announced, Chevron initiated an 
aggressive strategy of filing numerous section 1782 actions in various 
U.S. courts to gather evidence with which it could defeat the eventual 
attempts to enforce that judgment.150  These actions were successful, and 
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Chevron gained access to Donziger’s personal litigation files as well as 
over 600 hours of outtakes from the documentary Crude, a feature about 
Donziger and his campaign on behalf of the plaintiffs.151  This evidence 
included the “Invictus” memo from a law firm retained by plaintiffs, 
Patton Boggs LLP, which suggested that plaintiffs engage in numerous 
worldwide actions rather than a single enforcement action in the United 
States.152  The rationale was that a campaign of attaching Chevron assets, 
and thereby disrupting its activities, would lead to a settlement and be 
faster than a U.S. recognition and enforcement action.153  Chevron 
therefore filed a preemptive suit in the Southern District of New York 
against the plaintiffs and their attorneys, alleging claims under the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); state tort 
claims including fraud; state claims for civil conspiracy; violations of the 
New York Judiciary Law by Donziger and his law firm; and “a 
declaratory judgment, pursuant to the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 
that the Lago Agrio judgment is not entitled to recognition or 
enforcement in the United States or anywhere else.”154  The gist of 
Chevron’s complaint was that the judgment was the product of a judicial 
system that does not afford due process and was procured by the 
fraudulent scheme of plaintiffs’ attorneys.155 
The first significant moment in the U.S. proceedings was a 
temporary injunction preventing plaintiffs and their attorneys from 
having the judgment enforced anywhere in the world.156  The trial court 
found an immediate and irreparable injury based upon the plaintiffs’ 
Invictus strategy.157  The court also found that Chevron would likely 
succeed on the merits of its claims and win a declaratory judgment that 
the foreign judgment was not entitled to recognition and enforcement.158  
The court addressed two grounds under New York’s Foreign Money 
Judgment Recognition Act: the mandatory ground of systemic 
inadequacy in the courts of Ecuador and the discretionary ground of 
fraud in the procurement of the judgment.159  For the first ground, the 
court relied upon expert testimony and reports from the U.S. Department 
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of State and from international non-governmental organizations about 
systemic corruption and politicization in the courts of Ecuador.160  For 
the second ground, the alleged acts of misconduct included pressuring 
and bribing Ecuadoran judges and other government officials and 
ghostwriting the report of the supposedly neutral court-appointed expert 
upon which the damages were based.161  The Second Circuit reversed and 
dismissed the preliminary injunction, ruling that the grounds for non-
recognition under New York’s Recognition Act could be raised only 
defensively by the judgment debtor and not offensively under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.162  The Second Circuit noted several times 
that allowing this approach would cause unnecessary friction between 
courts of the U.S. and of other countries.163 
On remand, Chevron dropped all claims for damages and limited the 
relief it sought.164  It narrowed the injunction to prevent Donziger and 
two of the judgment creditors over whom the court had jurisdiction from 
profiting from the alleged fraud, and to enjoin enforcement only in the 
United States rather than worldwide, thus avoiding issues of comity or 
international relations.165  By seeking only injunctive relief, Chevron 
paved the way for a bench trial, which occurred in October and 
November of 2013.166  On March 4, 2014, Judge Kaplan issued his 
staggeringly long opinion in which he granted the injunction based upon 
fraud on the court, violations of RICO, and violations of state law.167  
While a detailed explication of the findings of fact is beyond the scope of 
this Article, Judge Kaplan’s summary of the fraud offers a sense: 
They submitted fraudulent evidence.  They coerced one judge, first to 
use a court-appointed, supposedly impartial, “global expert” to make an 
overall damages assessment and, then, to appoint to that important role 
a man whom Donziger hand-picked and paid to “totally play ball” with 
the LAPs [Lago Agrio Plaintiffs].  They then paid a Colorado 
consulting firm secretly to write all or most of the global expert’s 
report, falsely presented the report as the work of the court-appointed 
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and supposedly impartial expert, and told half-truths or worse to U.S. 
courts in attempts to prevent exposure of that and other wrongdoing.  
Ultimately, the LAP team wrote the Lago Agrio court’s Judgment 
themselves and promised $500,000 to the Ecuadorian judge to rule in 
their favor and sign their judgment.  If ever there were a case 
warranting equitable relief with respect to a judgment procured by 
fraud, this is it.168 
While Judge Kaplan recognized the environmental harm in the Orienté, 
and even the potential responsibility of Texaco and Chevron for some of 
that harm, he ruled that Donziger and his clients “were not entitled to 
corrupt the process to achieve their goal,” no matter how just their 
cause.169 
D. Parallel Proceedings: International Arbitration Between Chevron 
and Ecuador 
In addition to judicial proceedings in the United States and Ecuador, 
this dispute has included actions before international dispute resolution 
bodies, thus providing a rare glimpse at the possibility for international 
public law to affect transnational environmental torts.  These actions 
include arbitration brought by Chevron and Texaco against the Republic 
of Ecuador and PetroEcuador, and a request for preliminary measures 
filed by the Lago Agrio plaintiffs with the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) against Ecuador.170 
In 1993, the United States and Ecuador signed a BIT that entered 
into force on May 11, 1997, “to promote greater economic cooperation 
between them, with respect to reinvestment by nationals and companies 
of one Party in the territory of the other Party.”171  The provisions of this 
BIT resemble those of others between the United States and developing 
countries: they provide for national treatment, offer most-favored-nation 
status, and address expropriation.172  Article VI pertains to investment 
disputes “between a Party and a national or company of the other party 
arising out of or relating to . . . an investment agreement between that 
Party and such national or company.”173  Of particular relevance is 
Article VI(3), which gives the investing company the option “to consent 
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in writing to the submission of the dispute for settlement by binding 
arbitration,” and once that consent is given, “either party to the dispute 
may initiate arbitration.”174  Article VI(6) provides for the consent of 
both Ecuador and the United States to binding arbitration, which “shall 
be final and binding on the parties to the dispute.”175 
Even before the Ecuadoran trial court had issued a judgment in the 
Lago Agrio proceedings, Chevron and Texaco initiated arbitration 
pursuant to the BIT on September 23, 2009.176  It chose the option of the 
Arbitral Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), Texaco and Chevron (Claimants) proposing a panel 
of three arbitrators and naming its party-appointed arbitrator.177  
Claimants requested ten different forms of relief, with two forms being 
of particular importance.178  First, they sought a declaration that, pursuant 
to the remediation agreements from the 1990s, they “have no liability or 
responsibility for environmental impact . . . arising out of the former 
Consortium.”179  Second, they sought “a declaration that Ecuador or 
PetroEcuador is exclusively liable for any judgment that may be issued 
in the Lago Agrio Litigation” and “an order and award requiring Ecuador 
to indemnify, protect and defend Claimants.”180  Essentially, Chevron 
sought to have the judgment declared null, and in the alternative, to have 
Ecuador assume responsibility for any payments, most of which would 
go to Ecuador anyway.181 
The panel divided the merits of the dispute into two tracks, with the 
first to resolve Ecuador’s contention that Chevron was not a “Releasee” 
under the 1995 remediation agreements.182  On September 17, 2013, the 
tribunal issued the First Partial Award on Track I.183  Applying 
Ecuadoran law, the panel concluded that the 1995 agreement was 
intended to release forever all claims—both contractual and 
environmental—by Ecuador and PetroEcuador against TexPet.184  This 
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included a release of TexPet, the parent company Texaco, and their 
“principales y subsidiarias,” which the panel concluded extended to 
potential future parent companies like Chevron.185  Issues reserved for 
Track II included: whether Ecuador breached the remediation 
agreements, whether the claims of the Lago Agrio plaintiffs were 
individual, “collective or diffuse,” and thus essentially those of Ecuador 
itself, and the specific effect of the EMA on the remediation 
agreements.186 
The panel nonetheless decided that one issue appropriate for Track I 
was whether the individual plaintiffs could make diffuse claims for 
environmental harm to Ecuador without also claiming to have suffered 
personal harm.187  The tribunal concluded that under Ecuadoran law at 
the time of the remediation and settlement agreements, only Ecuador and 
not individual citizens had the right to bring environmental claims.188  
Accordingly, only Ecuador had the legal capacity to settle such claims—
which it did through the remediation agreements.189  The 1999 EMA, 
which granted private individuals standing to bring diffuse 
environmental claims, “could not revive the diffuse right . . . which had 
already been extinguished by the 1995 Settlement Agreement.”190  The 
tribunal concluded: “It is not juridically possible for a person to exercise 
a right which no longer exists.”191  At the time of this writing, the 
tribunal has not ruled on Track II. 
In response to the arbitration, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs on February 
9, 2012, filed a request with the IACHR against Ecuador.192  The request 
alleged that their “fundamental rights” would be harmed if Chevron 
obtained a declaration that the judgment was unenforceable.193  The 
plaintiffs sought “precautionary measures from the Republic . . . that the 
Republic will refrain from taking any action that would contravene, 
undermine, or threaten the human rights of the [plaintiffs].”194  In other 
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words, they wanted the IACHR to order the Ecuadoran government not 
to interfere with enforcement of the judgment.195  Although the IACHR 
can grant precautionary measures on a showing of imminent threat and 
irreparable harm, the plaintiffs withdrew their claims before they could 
be heard.196  Though the reasons are unclear, commentators have 
speculated “that plaintiffs were reluctant to antagonize Ecuador at this 
particular juncture of the international arbitration.”197 
IV. THE LACK OF ACCESS TO A U.S. FORUM FOR INDIVIDUAL 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TORT CLAIMS AND PROPOSED 
SOLUTIONS 
Drawing on the example of the Lago Agrio proceedings, Whytock 
and Robertson opine, “[a]ccess to justice requires not only court access, 
but also a potential remedy.”198  Foreign plaintiffs are often denied a 
forum for their environmental tort claims, whether in the United States or 
their home countries.199  Even if they win a judgment, the laws for 
recognition and enforcement may prevent them from ever collecting.200  
Numerous commentators have proposed solutions based upon revising 
FNC and enforcement laws, but these private law solutions introduce 
other problems and are incomplete; indeed, they may not have even 
changed the result in the Lago Agrio proceedings.201 
A. The Problems with FNC and Enforcement Laws 
U.S. courts provide a sophisticated body of substantive and 
procedural laws, including class actions, open discovery rules, 
contingency fee contracts, the right to a jury trial, and potentially large 
damage awards, including punitive damages.202  These features have 
enticed plaintiffs from around the world, in particular from developing 
countries like Ecuador, to pursue their claims in the United States 
because their own country’s courts do not provide them.203  For example, 
courts in Latin America do not have class actions or broad discovery, 
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vehicles that are essential to litigate mass tort claims.204  These courts do 
not allow contingency fee contracts with attorneys, and losing parties 
have to pay the winner’s costs and fees,205 thus making litigation by poor 
plaintiffs practically impossible.  Juries are not common, and awards are 
just a fraction of what can be recovered in the United States.206 
These disparities do not render a foreign forum inadequate under the 
adequacy prong of the FNC analysis, however.  U.S. courts routinely 
find that the foreign courts are adequate because the threshold is low: the 
parties must not be deprived of a remedy nor be treated unfairly.207  
Unless the foreign court lacks jurisdiction—to which defendants can 
stipulate—dismissal is proper, as it was in Aguinda.208  The reality, 
however, is that dismissal is usually outcome determinative.209  Many 
suits like those in Aguinda never get refiled following an FNC dismissal; 
those that are refiled do not make it to judgment, and settlements are only 
a fraction of what they would have been in the United States.210  Scholars 
writing at the time of the Aguinda dismissal therefore concluded that the 
plaintiffs would be denied access to a forum that could provide a 
meaningful remedy.211  Rogge framed it as a social, political, and ethical 
issue because the alleged tortfeasor is an American company and should 
thus be held accountable in U.S. courts.212  The FNC dismissal was 
particularly galling to Kimerling, who in a lengthy analysis concluded 
that the Aguinda trial court based its conclusions on “detailed but 
questionable factual assumptions” and a “balancing of private and public 
interest factors” that “was uneven.”213  A number of other scholars have 
raised this complaint.214  It is therefore unsurprising that Van Detta writes 
about the “illegitimacy,” “incoherence,” and “lack of principle” of the 
FNC doctrine.215 
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Like other Latin American countries, Ecuador enacted retaliatory 
legislation in response to FNC dismissals.216  Retaliatory legislation takes 
two basic forms.217  The first merely makes the courts of the home 
country unavailable if a claim is first filed abroad; the purpose of these 
statutes is to defeat the “available” consideration during FNC 
proceedings.218  Such statutes have not been successful.219  The second 
type of legislation creates procedural mechanisms, minimum damages, 
and pre-litigation bonds—among other measures—to make the prospect 
of litigating abroad more risky than remaining in the United States, thus 
encouraging U.S. multinationals not to move for FNC in the first 
place.220  The EMA is this second type,221 although it did not deter 
Texaco from seeking dismissal.  Even with this retaliatory legislation, 
not all potential plaintiffs have benefitted.  For example, the Amazon 
Defense Front and other plaintiffs’ attorneys claim to represent all the 
indigenous peoples, yet the Kichwa and Huaorani have been excluded 
from the alliances that participated in the Lago Agrio proceedings.222  
These tribes attempted to bring their own environmental lawsuit in 
Ecuador, but that case was rejected.223 
Even the plaintiffs who won the $9 billion judgment never really had 
a meaningful forum if they can never collect the money.  The 
intersection of FNC and U.S. recognition and enforcement laws create 
what commentators have variously labeled “boomerang litigation,” or the 
“enforcement loophole,” or an “access-to-justice gap.”224  As part of the 
adequacy determination at the FNC stage, plaintiffs often argue that their 
home country’s judiciary is corrupt and politicized, arguments that the 
defendants as movants counter.225  For example, as discussed in the 
Section on the Aguinda proceedings, plaintiffs proffered considerable 
evidence of political turmoil and other types of corruption.226  Baker and 
Parise write that, at the  time of Aguinda, Ecuador ranked among the 
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worst countries in Latin America for judicial corruption.227  For political 
reasons, however, U.S. courts hesitate to declare the judiciary of an 
entire country corrupt; thus, during FNC proceedings, “the courts either 
refuse to inquire into [corruption] of the judiciary, or they appl[y] only 
minimal scrutiny to ascertain whether the corruption would preclude 
[fairness] for the individual plaintiffs.”228  In Aguinda, Judge Rakoff 
rejected the broad and conclusory evidence of corruption because it did 
not make specific reference to the instant case.229  Further, the FNC 
determination focuses on whether the plaintiff, and not the defendant, 
will have an adequate forum;230 given the government of Ecuador’s 
filings with the trial court in support of the plaintiffs, Judge Rakoff could 
easily conclude that they would. 
A U.S. court again considers the adequacy of the foreign judiciary in 
an action to recognize and enforce a foreign money judgment.  The 
recognition and enforcement laws of most U.S. states contain a systemic 
inadequacy ground for mandatory non-recognition if “the judgment was 
rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or 
procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law.”231  
Although this ground addresses adequacy, the standards applied differ 
from those in the FNC proceedings: they are “stricter, defendant-focused, 
and ex-post.”232  The result is that the same evidence of broad corruption 
that was not relevant at the FNC stage now becomes determinative of a 
finding that the foreign forum is inadequate, and thus a mandatory 
ground for a finding that the foreign money judgment should not be 
recognized or enforced.233  Commentators reasoned that the Lago Agrio 
plaintiffs would be caught in the access-to-justice gap. 
The Second Circuit’s dismissal of Judge Kaplan’s temporary 
injunction might suggest that those predictions were overstated, but that 
holding does nothing to resolve the issue of access to a meaningful 
forum—and may even make recourse to U.S. courts more problematic.  
First, the Second Circuit reversed because the New York Recognition 
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Act does not apply offensively;234 this holding, therefore, does not apply 
to the typical action where the judgment creditor brings an action for 
recognition and enforcement and the judgment debtor raises the ground 
defensively.  The reason that Chevron filed a preemptive suit was 
because the plaintiffs made the strategic choice not to seek enforcement 
in the United States—they knew that the systemic inadequacy ground 
could be used against them, creating a Catch-22.235  Second, the court 
based its holding primarily upon the policy of the New York Recognition 
Act and engaged in little analysis of the text of the Act.236  A close 
reading of those statutes suggests that an offensive use might be 
proper.237  Because state law governs recognition and enforcement,238 
and because other courts have allowed preemptive non-recognition,239 
future judgment debtors could file preemptively in states not covered by 
the Second Circuit.  Rather than a victory for foreign plaintiffs, the 
Second Circuit’s opinion introduces more uncertainty for all parties, as 
well as rule of law issues.240  Third, dismissing the injunction did not end 
the matter but only highlighted the fact that U.S. laws offer other means 
for defendants to avoid adverse foreign judgments.  In addition to the 
systemic inadequacy ground, most states have a number of mandatory 
and discretionary grounds for non-recognition.241  And a particularly 
aggressive and well-funded judgment debtor could follow the lead of 
Chevron by gathering evidence through section 1782 proceedings and 
fighting enforcement through other means like the citizens’ suit 
provisions of RICO. 
B. Proposed Solutions 
These commentators have offered a number of solutions targeted at 
changing FNC and the recognition laws to allow foreign plaintiffs greater 
access to U.S. courts.  As a common law doctrine, the courts themselves 
could potentially exercise their discretion and apply the FNC standards 
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more strictly to retain more cases.  For example, the Supreme Court in 
Gulf Oil v. Gilbert listed the enforceability of any potential judgment as a 
private interest factor, yet the Court did not list it in a later case that 
involved foreign plaintiffs, Piper Aircraft v. Reyno.  Further, lower 
courts rarely apply it.242  When the factors present a close call, the 
balance might be tipped if the U.S. court concludes that a country has a 
history of judicial politicization and corruption or has enacted retaliatory 
legislation that might deny due process, and that any potential judgment 
might be unenforceable.243  Whytock and Robertson go farther and urge 
courts to apply the stricter systemic inadequacy standard from the 
recognition and enforcement stage to determine the adequacy of the 
foreign forum during FNC deliberations.244  Nothing in Supreme Court 
precedent prohibits such an inquiry.245  The result would be fewer 
dismissals to countries like Ecuador that have persistent problems with 
politicization and corruption of the judiciary.246  To strengthen this 
analysis, courts should likewise consider adequacy for both plaintiffs and 
defendants, thus foreclosing the possibility of dismissal for FNC because 
plaintiffs would not be denied due process, but then finding non-
recognition of a judgment because defendants were denied due 
process.247  In addition, a U.S. court “should include a ‘return jurisdiction 
clause’ . . . if the judgment proves unenforceable,” allowing the 
possibility to relitigate.248  Some commentators have even proposed that 
defendants agree to honor any adverse judgment without waiting for 
plaintiffs to bring an enforcement action.249 
For cases originally filed in the United States and dismissed for 
FNC, a number of commentators argue that judgment debtors should be 
estopped at the enforcement stage from arguing that the foreign judiciary 
is inadequate, unless the systemic inadequacy was unforeseeable at the 
time of dismissal.250  Some take a particularly tough stance on 
foreseeability.  For example, a defendant who at the FNC stage 
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maintained that a foreign court was adequate in light of U.S. State 
Department and other evidence that the governments and courts of 
developing countries are known to be corrupt should bear the risk of 
changed conditions like new retaliatory legislation.251 
Courts necessarily operate on a case-by-case basis, so they are not in 
the best position to craft a coherent approach to jurisdiction, standing, 
and forum for environmental tort claims.252  Scholars like Robertson 
advocate for new legislation on the rationale that Congress can provide 
better standardization and clarity via statutes and can provide a platform 
for intentional policymaking.253  Her ideal FNC legislation would open 
federal courts to cases brought by foreign plaintiffs.  Robertson argues 
that, “at a minimum . . . U.S. district courts [should] presumptively 
accept a case against U.S. resident defendants as long as jurisdiction and 
venue are satisfied.”254  Dismissal would be allowed only if the other 
country has an available forum and “the defendant would be unable to 
present its defenses in the U.S. due to difficulties in obtaining evidence 
or establishing jurisdiction over parties or witnesses located 
elsewhere.”255 
Van Detta would go beyond revising FNC and instead reject it 
outright on a corrective justice theory: U.S. multinational corporations 
receive a benefit from operating abroad while creating non-reciprocal 
risks for foreign plaintiffs, so U.S. substantive and procedural laws must 
merge to provide those plaintiffs a forum for redress.256  He proposes a 
preservation-of-court-access statute that conclusively presumes 
jurisdiction in the United States for corporations that have systematic and 
continuous minimum contacts here.257  Under his proposal, Aguinda 
should have remained in the Southern District of New York because the 
role of the parent corporation Texaco was downplayed in the FNC 
analysis.258  He argues that Texaco could have then brought a separate 
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action in the courts of Ecuador for indemnity or contribution from 
Ecuador and PetroEcuador.259 
C. Shortcomings of These Solutions 
Though these proposals could have a beneficial impact upon less 
complex proceedings, they suffer from a number of shortcomings when 
considered in light of the mass actions and class actions of environmental 
tort litigation.  Even if FNC were completely removed, some scholars 
contend that a case like Aguinda would be dismissed anyway.  Baker and 
Parise conclude that it would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under 
traditional conflicts of law balancing because the plaintiffs asserted 
claims both for personal and for environmental injuries, the latter of 
which necessarily occurred in Ecuador.260 
Under the more modest FNC proposals like Robertson’s, she would 
allow for dismissal if the defendant cannot gather evidence from abroad, 
or if the court cannot establish jurisdiction over a party.261  That was the 
precise situation in the Aguinda proceedings.  Texaco would have sought 
indemnity against the Republic of Ecuador, which refused to consent to 
jurisdiction in the United States, and refused to sign the Hague 
Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 
which would therefore require U.S. courts to resort to inefficient methods 
of gathering evidence like letters rogatory.262 
The difficulty in gathering evidence speaks to another point—while 
many scholars make compelling arguments that U.S. defendants should 
be held accountable in U.S. courts, they downplay or ignore the actual 
proceedings that would occur if the U.S. court maintained jurisdiction.263  
After all, the private and public interest factors relate to legitimate 
concerns for the parties and the courts.264  If courts cannot compel 
                                                          
 259.  Id. at 99. 
 260.  Baker & Parise, supra note 3, at 28–29. 
 261.  Robertson, supra note 3, at 1128. 
 262.  Ecuador, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index 
_en.php?act=states.details&sid=92 (last updated Nov. 13, 2014). 
 263.  See, e.g., Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 
TUL. L. REV. 309, 326–27, 333 (2002) (downplaying the Gilbert private interest factors because the 
Hague Service and Evidence Conventions and new technology afford access to witnesses and 
evidence located abroad); Patel, supra note 4, at 109–10 (urging U.S. courts to accept cases where 
the host country is corrupt so that corporations can be held more accountable); Phantom Torts, supra 
note 13, at 302–05 (summarizing critics of FNC who argue that the private and public interest 
factors are misapplied and that U.S. corporations can be held accountable only if the claims of 
foreign plaintiffs are heard in U.S. courts). 
 264.  See, e.g., Jennifer L. Woulfe, Note, Where Forum Non Conveniens and Preemptive 
 
368 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
witness testimony and the gathering of documents, this cuts against a 
fundamental part of U.S. procedure—the provision for broad discovery. 
More importantly, the inability of a U.S. court to assert power in a 
foreign country increases the potential for fraud to infect the 
proceedings.  Consider the DBCP pesticide cases, which share many 
similarities with the Lago Agrio proceedings.  After several cases were 
dismissed from U.S. courts on FNC grounds, Nicaragua enacted 
retaliatory legislation with the aid of the plaintiffs’ attorneys that allowed 
for the possibility of huge damage awards.265  This legislation was the 
“impetus” for a fraudulent scheme where U.S. and Nicaraguan attorneys 
recruited bogus plaintiffs, falsified work and medical documents, 
coached the plaintiffs to lie, and engaged in tactics of intimidation to 
prevent witnesses from coming forward.266  One case went to trial in Los 
Angeles and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs; only after years of 
appellate and writ proceedings was the fraudulent scheme uncovered and 
the judgment vacated.267  The trial judge wrote that she had lacked the 
“power to compel witness testimony or enter other orders that would 
have uprooted the fraud years earlier.”268  The situation with the EMA 
and the proceedings conducted thereunder is similar.  The EMA was 
hastily adopted with input from the plaintiffs’ attorneys, and its 
procedural and other mechanisms were not fine-tuned.269  “This highly 
politicized, legally fragile environment is necessarily ripe for 
manipulation by foreign attorneys on both sides.”270 
Assuming that Aguinda had gone forward in the United States and 
resulted in a judgment for plaintiffs, ChevronTexaco would have had to 
file a separate action in Ecuador to seek indemnity and contribution from 
the Republic of Ecuador, which runs counter to policies like reducing the 
multiplicity of proceedings.271  Further, any U.S. judgment would be 
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obtained under procedural rules that allow for broad discovery, while the 
indemnity trial would be governed by much more circumscribed 
Ecuadoran procedural rules.  It is therefore possible that ChevronTexaco 
could be liable under U.S. standards but unable to obtain indemnification 
under Ecuadoran standards.  Separate proceedings, especially in different 
countries that apply different procedural and evidentiary rules, risk 
inconsistent results.272 
While revising the recognition and enforcement laws to make them 
more uniform would be welcome to create uniformity, those changes 
likely would not make a practical difference.  Scholars focus much of 
their attention on the systemic inadequacy ground for non-recognition, 
but courts rarely apply that ground, choosing instead to apply less 
politically sensitive grounds for non-recognition.273  In the Lago Agrio 
proceedings, the New York Recognition Act ended up not even playing a 
role in Chevron’s eventual and successful tactic of a bench trial based on 
RICO.274 
V. THE POTENTIAL FOR SOLUTIONS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Commentators also critique the existing public international law 
regime for providing insufficient forums to individuals for resolving their 
environmental claims.275  Many international tribunals like the 
International Court of Justice are available only to sovereign states as 
parties.276  The interests of States and their people do not always 
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coincide, so States may not bring claims on behalf of their people.277  
Further, indigenous peoples like the plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio 
proceedings are not recognized as States, and their own countries often 
do not bring claims on their behalf because those countries are 
“unconcerned about the environmental needs and interests of their 
indigenous inhabitants.”278 
Those tribunals that do allow participation by individuals suffer from 
several important limitations.  For example, the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee can issue only non-binding opinions.279  In both the 
Human Rights Committee and the IACHR, individuals can bring claims 
only against sovereign states but not other private entities.280  The Lago 
Agrio plaintiffs initiated an action in the IACHR against Ecuador, but the 
Commission does not have jurisdiction over Chevron.281  In addition, 
those tribunals often have treaty-based restrictions on their subject matter 
jurisdiction.282  Even if the Lago Agrio plaintiffs had maintained their 
action against Ecuador, the IACHR can only grant relief for violations of 
human rights.283  The Lago Agrio plaintiffs secured a judgment based 
upon environmental torts, an area that has not reached the status in 
international law as a human right, even for indigenous peoples.284 
Despite the limitations of the existing regimes, turning to public 
international law may nevertheless provide a solution involving a merger 
of public and private international law.285  For example, Robertson sees 
an important role for the Executive in negotiating bilateral, and even 
multilateral, treaties that would ensure court access.286  She suggests that 
developing countries in negotiations for BITs could insist on provisions 
for their citizens to have access to U.S. courts for tort claims arising from 
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the conduct of U.S. defendants, and that the FNC doctrine should not 
apply to those cases.287 
Another potential for BITs is providing a means for alternative 
dispute resolution.  While Chevron’s initiation of arbitration multiplied 
the venues in which the stakeholders must contend,288 international 
arbitration also has the potential to provide a single forum for all 
stakeholders.  Sheffer recognizes five major actors in the operation of 
BITs: the Home State, which is the capital exporting state like the United 
States; the Host State, which often has natural resources, such as Ecuador 
and other developing countries; investors, typically multinational 
corporations that engage in operations in the Host State; impacted non-
State actors, such as citizens who reside near the corporate operations; 
and arbitration tribunals.289  Following a BIT, the Host State and investor 
typically enter into a concession agreement to conduct activities like 
mineral extraction and the construction of public utilities.290  An 
arbitration provision is a common feature of BITs between the United 
States and developing countries.  As with the U.S.-Ecuador BIT, these 
provisions allow the investor to bypass the Host State’s domestic courts 
and go to arbitration under specified rules.291  Current BITs focus on 
investor protection and the resolution of commercial disputes, but they 
have no provision for human rights and broader public interest 
considerations, nor do they allow for access by impacted non-State 
actors.292  This focus might actually undermine the Host State’s ability to 
regulate environmental protection and prevent corporate abuses of 
human rights.293 
Though the interests of developing countries and their citizens do not 
always align in the arena of commercial development,294 those States are 
nonetheless concerned with their citizens’ access to a forum—especially 
because their injuries are often compensated with public funds.295  While 
multinational corporations are often portrayed as more powerful than the 
Host States because of their tremendous capital, developing countries are 
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not without strength: specifically, Host States have sovereignty, and the 
accompanying right to grant concessions to develop natural resources.296  
To entice investors to agree to arbitration, Host States could therefore 
condition government benefits on investors agreeing to arbitration that 
includes individuals, whether as amicus curiae or as a mechanism to 
uphold human rights obligations.297  Foster writes that a necessary 
condition for the Host States to demand broader arbitration participation 
is that the arbitral tribunals not have jurisdiction to award monetary or 
other relief against the Host State.298  He cites the Lago Agrio 
proceedings for some examples of the benefits of citizen participation in 
international arbitration: it allows the Host State to meet its human rights 
obligations—in particular for their indigenous peoples—and it minimizes 
the possibility of multiple proceedings.299 
VI. ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION 
Although turning to BITs to open up U.S. courts or international 
arbitration tribunals to foreign plaintiffs has potential, this solution 
requires that the governments of the United States and of the Host State 
have “the political will” to open up participation,300 and assumes that 
corporations will continue to invest in the Host State when faced with the 
elimination of procedural obstacles to mass tort suits.  A rhetorical 
analysis of the actions and texts from the Lago Agrio proceedings 
suggests that these stakeholders do not want full participation, however.  
Stakeholders continually reverted to the language of ecospeak, often 
reducing complex relationships by identifying the interests of an absent 
party with those of a participating party, thus framing issues in terms of 
us versus them.  Indeed, this analysis shows that Ecuador as well as 
Texaco and then Chevron took advantage of the limitations of current 
fora to avoid exposing themselves to liability. 
A. Ecuador: Host State Avoids Liability by Controlling Proceedings 
Scholars have long documented how corporations take advantage of 
doctrines like FNC to avoid a U.S. trial, but the Ecuadoran government 
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in Aguinda also showed an unwillingness to expose itself to U.S.-sized 
liability.301  Ecuador first took the position that it did not support a trial in 
the United States—Ecuadoran ambassador to the United States Edgar 
Teran wrote in a letter that the action was “an affront to Ecuador’s 
national sovereignty,” and that “Ecuador had a paramount interest in 
formulating its own environmental and industrial policies, and that 
Ecuador’s courts were open to adjudicate such disputes.”302  This initial 
stance is justified in light of the continuum: the government of Ecuador 
shared an interest in the dispute based on its sovereignty, but it had 
interests that differed from the other stakeholders like big business and 
the plaintiffs.303  If Ecuador would have maintained that position, then 
this stance suggests that it would be open to a solution through a BIT.  
Treaties are the result of sovereign negotiations, so having a hand in 
choosing the forum, either in the United States or arbitration, would 
reinforce Ecuador’s say. 
Instead, Ecuador changed its stance, not only coming out in support 
of the plaintiffs but even filing a motion to intervene.304  In an affidavit, 
Ecuador’s attorney general contradicted its earlier stance by concluding 
that the intervention did not damage Ecuador’s sovereignty.305  Instead, 
Ecuador “looks to protect the interests of the indigenous citizens of the 
Ecuadorian Amazon who were seriously affected by the environmental 
contamination attributed to the defendant company.”306  By seeking to 
intervene, Ecuador explicitly identified its interests with the plaintiffs’, 
thus creating a plaintiff and Ecuador versus Texaco opposition. 
This stance was merely a frame, and in many ways a false frame, 
because it ignored the ways in which some interests of Ecuador and 
plaintiffs were adverse while some interests of Ecuador and Texaco were 
shared.307  For decades, PetroEcuador was part of the consortium and had 
a hand in operations, so the plaintiffs could potentially assert similar 
claims against Ecuador and PetroEcuador that they could against Texaco.  
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Texaco would therefore have a claim for contribution from its 
consortium partner.  The plaintiffs needed Ecuador to intervene to 
support their claim for equitable relief that would necessarily occur in 
sovereign Ecuadoran territory.  The plaintiffs therefore gave Ecuador and 
PetroEcuador a judgment reduction agreement in the amount of 
contribution that Texaco might obtain.308  Plaintiffs and Ecuador thus 
recognized different stakes and had to form an alliance to overcome them 
to put on a joint front against Texaco. 
Ecuador’s relationship with Texaco is more complicated than simple 
opposition, however.  No one disputes that petroleum operations in Lago 
Agrio have resulted in pollution.309  During the Aguinda proceedings, 
Texaco and Ecuador worked together to remediate that pollution.310  
While scholars have criticized the level of remediation actually 
performed by Texaco, Texaco did at least contract with outside providers 
and engage in $40 million worth of projects, while Ecuador itself 
performed no work—and has even continued to operate facilities and 
equipment that are dated and in disrepair.311  While this remediation 
occurred, Ecuador did not align its interests with the plaintiffs’, who 
were not consulted during negotiation of the remediation agreements.312  
Ecuador’s attempt at consubstantiation with plaintiffs in its motion to 
intervene is therefore a retreat to the monolithic concept of the nation-
state, a rhetorical construct that assumes a common space between 
government and people.313 
This construct is not false—or, at least, it need not have been.  
Ecuador could have entered the fray against Texaco by waiving 
sovereign immunity, an act that would have opened it to a claim for 
contribution for its share of the consortium’s operations or even 
indemnity based on the 1993 Memorandum of Understanding and 
subsequent remediation agreements.  The absence of Ecuador in the 
Aguinda proceedings weighed heavily in the decision to grant, and then 
affirm, an FNC dismissal.  Prior to reaching the elements of the FNC 
test, Judge Rakoff wrote “the Government of Ecuador, [] either directly 
or through the state-owned corporation PetroEcuador, regulated the 
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Consortium.”314  He called attention to the fact that Ecuador was not a 
named party nor could Ecuador be sued as a third-party defendant “since 
it has now formally affirmed that it will not waive sovereign 
immunity.”315  During the weighing of the private interest factors, his 
language in portraying the absence of Ecuador was quite strong: 
[R]eference must again be made to the glaring facts that neither the 
Government of Ecuador nor PetroEcuador, the state-run oil company 
that owns the Consortium and had primary control of it through much 
of the relevant time period, are parties to the instant suits, whereas they 
could be joined in any similar suit brought in Ecuador.316 
He also referenced the absence of Ecuador as a party in the public 
interest factors, characterizing preference given by the consortium to oil 
exploitation over environmental protection as a “conscious choice made 
by the Government of Ecuador” that could be adjudicated in Ecuador, 
“where (as noted) the Government of Ecuador can be joined as a 
party.”317  The Second Circuit affirmed, finding on the private interest 
factors that the “evidence of Texaco’s defenses implicating the roles of 
PetroEcuador and the Republic” is located in Ecuador.318  The Court 
continued: 
We also find significant that the Republic and PetroEcuador, neither of 
which are parties to the current suits, could be joined if the cases were 
resumed in Ecuador. . . .  We agree with the district court’s observation 
that in the absence of the Ecuadorian Republic as a party, a U.S. court 
would be incapable of effectively ordering several aspects of the 
equitable relief sought in the complaints.319 
The presence of Ecuador and PetroEcuador as parties may not have 
altered Judge Rakoff’s decision to dismiss, but it would have made for a 
closer balancing of the factors, especially since the Second Circuit had 
already remanded the first FNC dismissal. 
Their absence is more important for a rhetorical analysis of potential 
solutions to foreign plaintiffs’ lack of an adequate forum: when given the 
possibility of a forum that included full participation of all stakeholders, 
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Ecuador declined.320  Instead, it sought to avoid liability by controlling 
the proceedings.  By enacting the EMA, Ecuador could stay out of 
litigation while still providing plaintiffs a forum—a forum in which the 
bulk of the damages would flow back to Ecuador.321  By the time the 
Second Circuit affirmed dismissal, Texaco had completed its portion of 
the remediation, so Ecuador no longer needed to pretend to align its 
interests with Texaco.  Ecuador therefore enacted the EMA with the 
participation of the plaintiffs’ attorneys.322  Instead of being liable to 
plaintiffs, Ecuador would receive billions in damages from Chevron.  
Indeed, even individuals within the Ecuadoran government took 
advantage of the situation by accepting bribes from plaintiffs.323 
The actions of Ecuador show the obstacles to negotiating a BIT that 
will allow for participation by all stakeholders in a forum that can 
provide a full remedy.  One proposal is for foreign plaintiffs to get access 
to U.S. courts without the possibility of FNC dismissal.324  U.S. court 
access would obviate the need for laws like the EMA, thus eliminating 
one cause of fraud.  And the BIT could be negotiated to provide for 
streamlined access to witnesses and documents, thus eliminating another 
problem for defendants and offering a guard against fraud.  Ecuador has 
already declined to waive sovereign immunity, however, so why would it 
do so as part of a BIT?  The U.S. State Department is unlikely to agree to 
open its courts without a waiver of sovereign immunity, thereby 
exposing its corporations to multi-billion-dollar litigation that may be 
attributable in part to the Host State.  Without this waiver, proceedings in 
the United States would suffer from the same limitations as the Aguinda 
proceedings.  If the United States were to insist on a waiver, the Host 
State might simply pull out of BIT negotiations, deciding that its 
potential exposure is too great and reasoning that corporations might 
choose to invest anyway. 
The other option from a BIT is arbitration tribunals.  In the Chevron-
Ecuador arbitration, Ecuador portrayed its interests as separate from the 
plaintiffs’, characterizing them as “third parties” and their claims as 
“third-party claims.”325  From a rhetorical standpoint, this framing sends 
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a mixed message.  While welcome in its recognition of the complex 
interests and interrelationships in the environment, it also demonstrates 
Ecuador’s awareness that the interests of many of its citizens are adverse 
to its own.326  Host States will allow for citizen participation in 
international arbitration only if that tribunal has no jurisdiction over the 
Host State.327  Given its actions in the Aguinda proceedings, and 
subsequent attempts to avoid liability by controlling proceedings through 
the EMA, there is no reason to think that Ecuador would waive immunity 
simply because the forum is an arbitral tribunal rather than a U.S. court. 
B. ChevronTexaco: Corporations Take Advantage of Ambiguity to 
Identify Interests of Absent Party with a Present Party 
Nor would a multinational corporation like Chevron favor opening 
access to foreign plaintiffs.  A rhetorical analysis reveals that Texaco in 
Aguinda and now Chevron in arbitration have taken advantage of the 
limited access to the particular forum by identifying the absent party’s 
interests with another party.  In a twist on the result of the public debate 
over the proposed biomass facility in Valdosta, ChevronTexaco has 
prevailed by construing the absent party in narrow and exclusionary 
ways.  That outcome should not be surprising, however, because 
Ecuador’s arguments assume unproblematic and uncomplicated identities 
while ChevronTexaco has taken advantage of ambiguity to foster 
identifications that are more persuasive.328  In both sets of proceedings, 
the court has adopted ChevronTexaco’s framing of interests and rejected 
Ecuador’s attempts to show a multiplicity of interests.329  Because of its 
success, Chevron is likely to lobby against greater access. 
In Aguinda, Texaco identified its interests with Ecuador and 
PetroEcuador, focusing upon their shared responsibilities in operating the 
consortium and thus creating additional defendants.330  The Second 
Circuit recognized an inherent similarity in all three grounds upon which 
Texaco moved to dismiss: “the close participation of the Ecuadoran 
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government in the activities for which Texaco was sought to be held 
liable.”331  The evidence submitted by Texaco showed that PetroEcuador 
not only had an ownership stake, but also operational involvement, 
including becoming the “sole operator.”332  The trial court adopted 
Texaco’s view that Ecuador and PetroEcuador “regulated the Consortium 
from the outset” and “had primary control of it through much of the 
relevant time period.”333  The Second Circuit likewise recognized that 
Texaco’s defense was predicated upon “implicating the roles of 
PetroEcuador and the Republic.”334  As described in the previous 
subsection, the three binary relationships among the plaintiffs, Ecuador, 
and Texaco involved both overlapping as well as separate interests.335  
While Ecuador framed its interests as aligning with the plaintiffs’, 
Texaco framed Ecuador as opposed to the plaintiffs, and thus as another 
defendant.336  In light of Ecuador’s refusal to waive sovereign immunity 
and join as a party, the courts accepted Texaco’s narrative.337 
Chevron has carried this strategy forward in the arbitration, except 
that plaintiffs are the absent party, so Chevron has identified the interests 
of the plaintiffs as aligned with those of Ecuador.  The panel devotes 
considerable space to each party’s arguments in the First Partial Award 
on Track I.338  A textual analysis reveals that Chevron’s arguments are 
rhetorically effective because they take a nuanced approach to creating 
identification, whereas Ecuador argues for division based upon a more 
simplistic and artificial division of interests.  Chevron conceded that the 
1995 settlement agreement with Ecuador did not preclude environmental 
claims made by individuals for personal harm.339  The Lago Agrio 
plaintiffs did not prevail on personal injury claims, however, but on 
claims based solely on the EMA, which grants individuals standing to 
sue for environmental harms to the state.340  Before passage of the EMA 
in 1999, only the Republic of Ecuador and not individual Ecuadorans 
would have had standing to assert these claims.341  In this way, the 
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plaintiffs’ standing is based upon a collective right, a right shared by 
Ecuador, rather than the individual claims that were asserted in 
Aguinda.342  Because Ecuador had released Chevron’s predecessor 
Texaco from liability before 1999, Ecuador could not revive that right by 
transferring standing to its citizens.343  The essence of Ecuador’s 
response is that collective rights did not exist in 1995 and were only 
manifested for the first time in the 1999 EMA, so it could not have 
settled individual claims in 1995.344  Most telling is Ecuador’s attempt to 
distance itself from the Lago Agrio plaintiffs, portraying them as “third 
parties” so that Ecuador’s releasing Texaco from liability in the 
remediation agreements would not apply to the plaintiffs.345  The tribunal 
accepted part of Ecuador’s argument, agreeing that individuals did not 
have the ability to assert an individual claim in 1995, but the tribunal 
concluded that Ecuador did have that right in 1995, which it exercised by 
releasing Texaco and its successors from liability.346  Rather than create a 
collective right, the 1999 EMA merely attempted to revive a right that 
had already been extinguished.347 
Though for different reasons than Ecuador, Chevron would likewise 
oppose a BIT, whether it opened up U.S. courts or provided for 
international arbitration.  In Aguinda, Texaco won dismissal in part by 
portraying Ecuador as a co-defendant that could not be made a party.348  
Even if the BIT contained a waiver of sovereign immunity, Chevron 
would therefore prefer to keep Host States like Ecuador out of U.S. 
proceedings so it can maintain this advantage in framing identities.  In 
the arbitration, Chevron has been able to prevail thus far by identifying 
the plaintiffs with Ecuador, so it does not want plaintiffs, even as amici, 
to have the ability to offer their own arguments to the tribunal.  After all, 
these plaintiffs have at least attempted to bring separate claims against 
Ecuador in the IACHR.  If arbitration had been available to the 
individual plaintiffs from the outset, it is likely that the plaintiffs would 
have asserted only claims for injury to themselves and their personal 
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property, and not for environmental harm,349 undercutting the entire basis 
for Chevron’s argument. 
Robertson describes how Congress is subject to interest-group 
lobbying, so that domestic legislation that opened court access would be 
opposed by large oil and gas entities like Chevron.350  A BIT requires 
executive negotiation and Congressional ratification, so Chevron could 
certainly apply the same pressure to Congress and the Department of 
State to keep individual access provisions out of BITs.  Plus, the BIT 
only opens up the potential for investment; the Host State and 
corporations must follow through with concession agreements.351  
Investors would weigh the increased exposure in deciding whether or not 
to invest.  Given the Host State’s interests in economic development, an 
interest that is sometimes adverse to its own citizens, the Host State 
might even agree to concession agreement workarounds to open forums. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Ecospeak is a retreat to entrenched positions, a resort to ready-made 
labels that prevent finding solutions based upon the interests of all 
stakeholders.  The purpose of rhetorical analysis is to study the 
environmental discourse and push past the ecospeak for points of 
identification that might lead to cooperation.352  Accordingly, while this 
analysis has revealed ways in which Host States and investor 
corporations have taken advantage of the lack of access to a forum by 
foreign plaintiffs, it has also shown ways in which all three sets of 
stakeholders have—at various points—worked together.  From these 
points of identification might emerge the seeds of a solution. 
For example, all sides agreed on the need for environmental 
remediation, either through the direct negotiation of Ecuador and Texaco 
for the remediation agreements, or via the environmental damage awards 
made possible by the EMA.353  Although individual plaintiffs might be 
precluded from bringing some claims for environmental harms, nothing 
in the language of current BITs precludes the Host State from bringing 
those claims.  Indeed, the Chevron-Ecuador BIT allows either the 
investor or Ecuador to initiate arbitration, and that arbitration could 
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extend to the tort effects of commercial activities.354  In this particular 
case, Ecuador settled separately and cheaply with Texaco, but other 
nations might take advantage of international arbitration in the future.355 
While current BITs might expedite the resolution of general 
environmental harms, they do nothing to open up access for individual 
claims.  Again, we can look at points of identification to seek a solution.  
Host States and investing corporations do not resist opening access to 
individual plaintiffs because their interests are completely opposed; after 
all, the continuum of interests shows that there are points where interests 
intersect.  Rather, Host States and corporations want to avoid exposure to 
U.S.-sized damages, both actual and punitive.356  In Aguinda, Texaco 
sensibly did not want to remain in a forum where it would have to pay 
damages for a class that included 30,000 Ecuadorans, nor would Ecuador 
want to assume even a fraction of those damages.357 
FNC has been a popular device because developing countries often 
have substantially lower damage awards than are common in the United 
States.358  While these awards may be modest by U.S. standards, they can 
represent several times the average family’s annual income, and 
therefore have a real impact on citizens of that developing country.359  
BITs have the potential to account for these awards because the United 
States and Host State could create a provision that allows for access to 
arbitration for individuals, but keys damages to average incomes in the 
Host State or to reflect some measure like a multiplier of Host State 
incomes.  This approach merges solutions proposed by scholars who see 
a role for BITs and international arbitral tribunals, with those who call 
for a return to choice of law principles that draw on Host State laws.360  
With a recovery thus limited, investors may be more willing to allow 
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participation by individuals in arbitration, even if the Host State is 
immune from claims. 
I characterized this proposal as only the seeds of a solution because it 
is not perfect.  For example, from an efficiency perspective, it may not 
sufficiently deter tortious acts because the U.S. multinational measures 
profits by U.S. standards but damages by the standards of developing 
countries.361  However, as this environmental rhetoric analysis has 
shown, none of the other solutions are perfect either—and they may not 
even be feasible in light of the positions taken by stakeholders in the 
Lago Agrio proceedings.  By taking account of points of identification 
among stakeholders, however, environmental rhetoric offers another 
perspective for scholars to consider as they debate how best to provide 
access to justice for foreign individuals alleging environmental torts. 
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